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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
WALTER W. SPRAGUE and UNITED
STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY
COMPANY, a corporation,

Respondents,

v.
BOYLES BROS. DRILLING
P ANY, a corporation,

Case No.
8351

COM-

Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The judgment appealed from was entered at the conclusion of a non-jury trial of an action involving charges
and countercharges of breaches of a subcontract providing
for the production of rock to be used by respondent Sprague
in the performance of his contract with the United States
wherein he undertook to construct a levee on the banks of
the Snake River in the vicinity of Rigby, Idaho (R. 1-18,
R. 26-30).
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The subcontract provided for the production of the
rock by the joint efforts of appellant and Sprague. Appellant undertook to break into size 50 to 350 pounds a
minimum of 12,200 tons of native rock located in the Olsen
Quarry. The rock was to be broken in time to enable
Sprague to deliver it to the levee within the time limit of
his contract with the Government. Sprague agreed to
furnish sufficient compressed air to operate appellant's
drills efficiently, and to remove the rock from the quarry
as it was broken into the sizes specified "so as not to cause
delay." Sprague promised to pay appellant for breaking
the rock at the rate of forty-eight cents per ton, and to
make a progress payment of seventy-five percent of the
contract price on or before April 20, 1950. In the event
more than 12,200 tons of rock were required for the levee
which Sprague had agreed to construct, appellant promised
to break the excess provided it was requested to do so before it had broken the required minimum of rock. If the
breaking of the 12,200 tons of rock into the sizes specified
resulted in the production of other usable or salable rock,
Sprague agreed to pay for it at the rate of forty-eight
cents per ton at the time of sale or use. The subcontract
further provided that if appellant should be unable to furnish adequate labor, equipment or material to complete the
subcontract within the time specified, Sprague could in
the name of appellant "put on such additional force and
outfit as may be required" at the expense of appellant (R.
8-10).
The complaint alleges in the first count that defendant
only partially performed its obligations under the sub-
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contract; that Sprague- paid $8,087.08 for labor, material,
supplies, equipment, rental and service-s to complete the
performance of appellant's obligations under the subcontract; that he paid appellant $4,392.00 and that there was
a balance of $5,085.16 due him. He claimed that he "was
entitled to receive" from the defendant because of its failure to complete its obligations under the subcontract "the
sum of $2,500.00 for additional loading and hauling costs."
Sprague alleged also that he was penalized $1,050.00 for
his failure to perform his prime- contract within the time
therein specified and attributed his default under the prime
contract to defendant's alleged failure to perform the subcontract (R. 1-3).
A second cause of action in the complaint asserted that
the plaintiff United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company
had furnished Sprague the payment and performance bonds
required by his prime contract. It reiterated the charges
of failure on the part of appellant to complete the subcontract, the expenditures made to complete appellant's obligations, the penalty imposed upon Sprague, and the "additional loading and hauling costs." Contrary to the first
count, the second count stated that the progress payment
made to appellant, the payment of the additional loading
and hauling costs, the expenditures to complete the subcontract and the payment of the penalty against Sprague were
all made by the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company. It claimed the right to be subrogated to all claims
which Sprague had against defendant under the subcontract (R. 3-7).
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The answer and counterclaim of defendant conceded
that defendant had not broken the minimum quantity of
rock specified in the subcontract. As justification for its
failure in that regard, it asserted that Sprague failed and
neglected to furnish compressed air for the operation of
its drills, failed and neglected to move the rock from the
quarry as it was broken into the sizes specified, and also
failed and neglected to make the progress payment within
the time required by the subcontract, or at all. It also
asserted that it learned that Sprague was insolvent and
financially unable to perform his part of the subcontract.
The answer and counterclaim further alleged that following the foregoing defaults on the part of Sprague, defendant removed its equipment and employees from the
quarry, that thereupon the plaintiff United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Company prevailed upon the defendant to resume the performance of the subcontract, and assured the
defendant that if it would do so, United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Company would make the progress payment
which Sprague had failed to make and would comply with
all of the provisions of the subcontract to be performed
by Sprague ; that in reliance upon such assurance, the defendant returned its equipment and employees to the quarry,
and resumed performance of the subcontract. Defendant
admitted that the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company made the progress payment as promised, but alleged
that it failed to furnish compressed air for the operation
of defendant's drills, except for a short period of time.
Defendant also alleged that because of the failure of the
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company to furnish
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the compressed air as promised, defendant again stopped
performance under the subcontract and again removed its
men and equipment from the quarry (R. 11-16).
Although the trial court made and entered what are
designated as Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
there was no determination made of the controlling issues
above set forth (R. 26-29). That court did conclude that
Sprague "performed his part of the contract," and that
appellant "breached the contract." It also concluded that
Sprague suffered damages "for increased cost of loading
and hauling rock" and in certain stated sums for rock purchased, and because of expenditures made "in performing
those things required by the subcontract to be performed"
by the defendant (R. 26-30). Upon these conclusions the
court entered judgment in favor of both plaintiffs in the
amount of $12,187.27, plus interest and costs, and dismissed
the defendant's counterclaim (R. 30).
Defendant commenced operations in the quarry a few
days before Christmas of 1949 (R. 287).
The primary breaking of the rock was done by the use
of explosives (R. 85). A tunnel referred to in the record
as a coyote hole was driven into the wall of the quarry a
distance of seventy-five feet (R. 288). At the end of the
tunnel two wings were drilled outward thirty feet on each
side of the tunnel, and an enlarged pocket was made at
the tip of each wing (R. 288).
The tunnel work was done by the use of a piece of
equipment designated as a leyner (R. 288). The drills are
mounted on the leyner and operated by compressed air (R.
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288). Sprague furnished a Schramm 315 air compressor
which was brought to the quarry on the evening of December 20, for defendant's use in running the leyner (R. 288).
The compressor was in poor mechanical condition, and
several hours were spent by the employees of both Sprague
and defendant in getting the compressor started (R. 289).
After finally getting it in operation, constant difficulty
was encountered getting it started at the beginning of the
day ( R. 290-4) . It failed completely on several occasions
and had to be taken from the quarry for repairs ( R. 334) .
One of defendant's employees stated that defendant lost
fourteen shifts of work because of the mechanical failures
of the compressor (R. 213-14) (Ex. 40) (R. 337). As a
result of these delays, the tunnel was not completed until
February 3 (R. 86). On that day a large amount of dynamite was placed in the enlarged pockets on the wings of
the tunnel and exploded (R. 86). Several thousand tons of
rock were broken by the blast and fell to the floor of the
quarry (Ex. 25) (R. 293). A large amount of the broken
rock was over-size and required secondary breaking to
make it conform to the subcontract (R. 316). The secondary
breaking was done by either drilling a hole in which dynamite was inserted, or by plastering the dynamite on the
outside of the rock (R. 359). Defendant promptly proceeded with the secondary breaking, and by the latter part
of February, all visible rock in the quarry was broken into
the sizes specified in the subcontract (R. 327).
Sprague made no attempt to remove any of the contract
size rock from the quarry, and defendant's employees were
withdrawn from the quarry (R. 340, R. 116). In the latter
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part of April, defendant was informed that Sprague would
immediately commence removal of the rock. An employee was dispatched to the quarry to resume work as soon
as the broken rock was removed (R. 342). This employee
remained at the quarry for a week or ten days, and since
Sprague had made no atte~pt to remove any rock, the
employee left the quarry and removed defendant's equipment (R. 343).
In July, plaintiff, United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company, learned that Sprague had incurred obligations
in excess of $30,000.00 which he was unable to pay (R.
207-14). Among these bills owing was the progress payment due the defendant (R. 242-43). The surety made the
progress payment to defendant, and prevailed upon it to
resume the work of breaking the rock (R. 97) (Ex. 28).
Sprague or his surety moved a few tons of the contract size
rock from the quarry in May and on August 1st resumed
hauling of the rock to the levee. On August 3rd defendant
returned its men and equipment to the quarry and resumed
operations (R. 363). Defendant was supplied with a small
compressor to operate its drills for secondary breaking (R.
364). Soon after defendant resumed operations in the
quarry it became necessary to break additional native
rock (R. 365). A large compressor was required to drill
the deeper holes needed for the primary breaking (R. 3677). This was furnished on August 16 (R. 365). On September 21, the bearings in the large compressor burned out,
and it was removed from the quarry (R. 366) . It evidently
was beyond repair, because it was never returned to the
quarry (R. 411). The compressor which remained in the
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quarry was a small one and would operate only one drill
for secondary breaking (R. 366). The plaintiffs ende·avored
to obtain another compressor, but were unable to do so (R.
412-3). Defendant's equipment and employees remained at
the quarry from September 21 until October 5, during which
time they were unable to do any work in the quarry because
of the lack of a compressor ( R. 372) . On October 5, defendant withdrew its employees and equipment from the
quarry, and did not thereafter resume performance of the
subcontract ( R. 387-8) .
The trial court found that the defendant broke into
sizes specified in the subcontract a total of 9, 799 tons (R.
27). Sprague admitted that he sold 1,000 tons of the rock
broken by defendant, and that this rock was not used on
the levee (R. 251). This was over-size rock (R. 251).
Sprague's contract with the Government as amended subsequent to the subcontract required 15,400 tons of rock of
the sizes specified in the subcontract (R. 27).
After defendant left the quarry on October 5, plaintiffs
proceeded to produce the additional rock required to complete the prime contract (R. 119).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE IT IS CONTRARY TO
THE EVIDENCE WHICH ESTABLISHES
THAT THE ONLY BREACH OF THE SUBCONTRACT WAS THAT COMMITTED BY
PLAlNTIFFS.
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POINT II
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT
BREAK THE ROCK INTO CONTRACT SIZE
IN A WORKMANLIKE MANNER.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
PROVE THAT THE COST TO PLAINTIFF OF
:PE,ODUCING THE ADDITIONAL ROCK EXCEEDED WHAT HE AGREED TO PAY DE...
FEND ANT.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE
PLAINTIFFS ANY AMOUNT ON ACCOUNT
OF LOADING OR HAULING COSTS.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFFS $850.00 ON ACCOUNT OF SPRAGUE'S
FAILURE TO COMPLETE HIS PRIME CONTRACT.
POINT VI
UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY COMPANY IS LIABLE TO DEFENDANT
FOR FAILURE TO FURNISH COMPRESSED
AIR BECAUSE IT ASSUMED THE OBLIGATIONS OF SPRAGUE UNDER THE SUBCONTRACT.
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POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFFS $292.80 FOR ROCK PURCHASED.
POINT VIII
THEJUDGMENTISERRONEOUSBECAUSE
IT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS
OF FACT.
POINT IX
THE JUDGMENT MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF THE COURT
TO FIND ON THE MATERIAL ISSUES
RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS.
POINT X
THE PRESENT ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ABATED BECAUSE OF THE PENDENCY OF
ANOTHER SUIT.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE IT IS CONTRARY TO
THE EVIDENCE WHICH ESTABLISHES
THAT THE ONLY BREACH OF THE SUBCONTRACT WAS THAT COMMITTED BY
PLAINTIFFS.
The failure of plaintiffs to furnish defendant with
sufficient compressed air to operate its drills efficiently,
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and to remove the rock from the quarry as it was broken
into contract size is established by evidence which is without any conflict whatever. Their failure to make the
progress payment as provided by the subcontract until
more than three months after it was due is admitted by
them. It is likewise conceded by plaintiffs that at least as
of July, Sprague was financially unable to proceed unde,r
either his subcontract or his prime contract, and that the
surety upon his payment and performance bonds was compelled to pay out in excess of $30,000.00 on account of
labor and material furnished him. We shall elaborate on
these breaches of the subcontract in the order above indicated.
It will be noted that the subcontract is dated more
than a month after defendant commenced work in the
quarry. Whether it was executed prior to its date does
not appear in the evidence, but it is clear that its terms
were agreed upon before the defendant started operations.
Sprague recognized his obligation to furnish sufficient
compressed air to operate defendant's drills efficiently by
procuring a Schramm 315 compressor, which he delivered
to the quarry on December 20. His breach of this obligation occurred immediately upon delivery of the compressor
to the quarry, and continued throughout the time defendant was engaged in drilling the coyote hole. It required
the combined efforts of two of Sprague's employees and at
least one of defendant's employees for a period of several
hours to get the compressor started initially. Practically every
morning thereafter defendant's employees encountered more
or less difficulty starting it (R. 336). Although adequate
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in size, it was in very poor mechanical condition (R. 333).
The release valves would not disengage, which caused the
motor to stop. Two days after it arrived at the quarry, it
was sent to Idaho Falls for repairs (R. 334). About two
weeks later, the clutch went out and it was again sent to
ldaho Falls after a mechanic sent to the quarry was unable
to repair it (R. 330). During the period the compressor
was used to operate the leyner, the defendant was required
to pay its employees for fourteen shifts of standby time
due to the failure of the compressor (See plaintiff's Exhibit
40). A shift consisted of two workmen and a day and a
night shift were employed (R. 335).
At no time did Sprague or any of his employees operate or assist in the operation of the compressor except to
get it started initially (R. 334). Defendant's employees
alone operated the compressor. They were skilled in the
operation of various types of air compressors.
Following the completion of the coyote hole, the Schramm
compressor was removed from the quarry (R. 338).
For defendants use in the secondary breaking of rock,
Sprague furnished a 105 Leroi compressor which would
produce only seventy or eighty pounds of compressed air
(R. 338). It furnished barely enough compressed air to
operate one drill. Nevertheless, before the end of February,
defendant broke into the sizes specified in the contract all
of the rock broken by the blast in the coyote hole and which
was exposed in the quarry.
Sprague failed to remove the contract size rock from
the qu,arry and about May 1 defendant ceased operations
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in the quarry. In the latter part of July Sprague's surety
made the April payment due under the subcontract and
prevailed upon defendant to resume breaking rock.
On August 3, defendant sent its men and equipment
back to the quarry to resume breaking rock. On August
1, plaintiffs started to haul away the rock that had been
broken to contract size. Some of the oversize rock broken
by the ·primary explosion was in the quarry, and defendant
proceeded with the work of breaking it into contract size.
It sent three jack hammers to the quarry to do the secondary breaking. However, only the Leroi 115 compressor
was furnished to operate these jack hammers. It soon became necessary to do further primary breaking of rock,
and mucll more compressed air was required than could
be supplied by the Leroi compressor. In response to defendant's demand, the plaintiffs rented from Bergraph Brothers a 315 compressor which was delivered to the quarry
about August 19. A compressor of this size was required to
operate the drills to make the holes needed for the primary
breaking of the rock. After the arrival of the Bergraph
compressor, the breaking of the rock by the defendant proceeded at a very rapid pace. Defendant employed five men
on two shifts. Three drills were kept in operation and during the next four or five weeks several thousand tons of
rock were broken by the defendant into the sizes specified
in the subcontract. This was hauled away by the plaintiffs
without unreasonable delay. This stepped-up activity in
the quarry was abruptly halted on the evening of September
21, when the bearings in the Bergraph compressor burned
out (R. 365-6). Plaintiffs' superintendent was immediately
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notified of the failure of the Bergraph compressor and he
. tried to locate another one because "I was aware of the fact
, that we must have another compressor. Now whether I started
to locate one before he told me or after, but as soon as it
brok~ down, as soon as I got to town, I started to locate
· anothe~ compressor" (R. 414). He returned the compressor
to Bergraphs and requested that "they repair it immediately ~R. 411). He kept pressing Bergraph Brothers "trying to expedite the repairing of it" (R. 412). He also contacted "every equipment house and contractor, or anybody
who I thought might have a compressor or know of a compressor throughout the state and two surrounding states,
trying to locate a compressor, and I sat on the phone for
hours and hours and hours calling" (R. 412). During this
period from September 21, until October 5, defendant's
equipment and employees remained idle in the quarry. Defendant was required to pay one of its employees for full
time during this period, while he sat in the quarry waiting
for compressed air to operate the defendant's equipment.
Several other employees were paid show-up time during
this period and held themselves in readiness to return to
the quarry. Defendant removed its equipment and employees from the quarry on October 5 (R. 372).
I

•

•

•

The failure of Sprague to remove the rock from the
quarry concurrently with its being broken into contract
size occurred prior to the time his surety induced the defendant to resume performance of the subcontract.
All of the rock broken by the initial blast and which
was exposed in the quarry was rebroken to contract size
by the defendant before the end of February. The precise
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amount of rock thus broken may not be definitely established but the records maintained by the plaintiffs disclose
that more than 1,000 tons of rock were broken into contract
size in the quarry prior to February 23 (R. 360-1). None
of this rock was removed from the quarry for a period of
more than two months. About the last week in April,
Sprague informed defendant that he would start removing
this contract size rock from the quarry (R. 342). Defendant promptly sent one of its employees to the quarry to
resume secondary breaking of rock. He remained at the
quarry with his equipment waiting for Sprague to remove
the rock. Sprague failed to remove any of the rock, and
about May 1, defendant withdrew its employee and equipment from the quarry (R. 343).
Sprague kept a record of the date each ton of contract
size rock was removed from the quarry. This record consisted of weigh tickets issued by an employee of the United
States, who weighed the rock on scales just outside the
quarry (Ex. 32). One copy of the weigh ticket was given
to Sprague and one copy to the trucker who hauled the
rock. The weigh tickets issued to Sprague and the copies
issued to the truckers were introduced in evidence by the
plaintiffs.. Mrs. Sprague who kept the books for her husband summarized these weigh tickets in Exhibit 49. According to these records no contract size rock whatever
was moved from the quarry until May 7, when a little more
than 24 tons were hauled away. On May 15, 114 tons, on
May 16, 194 tons, and on May 17, 248 tons of contract size
rock were hauled away from the quarry. No contract size
rock was removed from the quarry after May 17, until
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August 1. On Aug~st 1,_ 198 tons and on August 2, 222
tons were removed (Ex. 3Z) . .
·The foregoing breaches of Sprague's covenants fn the
subcontract have several legal consequences, all of which
are exactly opposite to the judgment appealed from. The
first is that the failure of Sprague or his surety to furnish
the defendant with sufficient compressed air to operate its
drills ~fficiently after it had been induced by the surety to
resume production of rock justified the defendant in stopping performance of its part of the subcontract. The legal
effect of Sprague's failure to- furnish compressed air while
defendant was drillin"g the coyote holes will be considered
later.·
As has been pointed out, the 315 compressor broke
down ·completely on the -evening of September 21. ·This left
in the quarry only the 105 Leroi compressor, which was
barely sufficient to operate one drill for secondary breaking. Defendant then had three drills in the quarry with
five employees to operate them. The 315 compressor was
required to do the primary breaking of the rock, and inasmuch as all of the rock broken by the explosion in the
coyote holes had been rebroken into contract size and removed from the quarry, the failure of the 315 compressor
completely halted the further production of rock. Apparently, the failure of the 315 compressor was beyond repair,
as it was taken from the quarry to Idaho Falls and never
returned. Defendant's equipment remained idle in the
quarry until October 5, as did two of its employees. Its
other employees remained in readiness to resume work in
the quarry. No compressed air of any kind was furnished
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by either Sprague or his surety during this period of more
than two weeks, except what could be produced by the
small Leroi compressor which was useless to the defendant because it could not be used for primary breaking.
Plaintiffs fully realized that their failure to furnish compressed air at this time prevented the defendant from producing the rock, as they made frantic efforts to procure
another compressor. They were not, however, able to do so
and defendant was fully justified in stopping performance
before the additional rock had been produced. Such justification is set forth in Restatement of the Law of Contracts
(Sec. 274).
"(1) In promises for an agreed exchange any
material failure of performance by one party not
justified by the conduct of the other discharges the
latters duty to give the agreed exchange even though
his promise is not in terms conditional. An immaterial failure does not operate as such a discharge."

The trial court in its Memorandum Decision recognized
the failure of Sprague and his surety to comply with the
covenant to furnish defendant sufficient compressed air
to operate its drills efficiently, but stated that it was not
sufficient in time or effect to constiute a rescission or cancellation of the contract. The trial judge was not only
confused with respect to the testimony of the witnesses on the subject of compressed air furnished to the
defendant, but he misconceived the law applicable to a
breach of contract. The defendant made no claim either
in its pleadings or at anytime in the course of trial that it
had the right to rescind the contract or have it cancelled.
On the contrary, the defendant asserts, and has at all times
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asserted, that the breach of the covenant by Sprague to
furnish compressed air legally justified it in failing to produce the amount of rock required by the contract, and gave
it the right to recover the damage sustained by it as a
result of the breach. The right to rescind a contract rests
upon entirely different considerations from those which
give a right of action for damages or which justify a party
in refusing to perform its part of a contract. The distinctions are pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Anvil Mining Company v. Humble, 153 U. S. 540.
In that case the plaintiffs and defendant entered into a
contract by the terms of which the plaintiffs undertook to
mine a certain quantity of ore during a specified period
from the defendant's mine. The defendant undertook to
lift the ore after it had been placed on the skips by the
plaintiff at the first level of the mine. There was· testimony
that the defendant interfered with the plaintiffs' performance of the contract. The court instructed the jury as
follows:
"If the jury find from the evidence that the
plaintiffs were in good faith endeavoring to carry
out and perform said contract according to its terms,
and the defendant wantonly or carelessly and negligently interfered with and hindered and prevented
the plaintiffs in such performance to such an extent
as to render the performance of it difficult, and
greatly decrease the profits which the plaintiffs
would otherwise have made, then and in such case
such interference was unauthorized and illegal and
would have justified the plaintiffs in abandoning
the contract, and would have entitled them to recover
such damages as they actually suffered by being
hindered and prevented from performing such contract."
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The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs
and the defendant contended that the instruction permitted
the plaintiffs to recover damages and at the same time
rescind the contract. The Supreme Court of the United
States disposed of this point as follows:
"It is insisted, and authorities are cited in support thereof, that a party cannot rescind a contract
and at the same time recover damages for his nonperformance. But no such proposition as that is
contained in that instruction. It only lays down the
rule, and it lays that down correctly, which obtains
when there is a breach of contract. Whenever one
party thereto is guilty of such a breach as is here
attributed to the defendant, the other yarty is at
liberty to treat the contract as broken and desist from
any further effort on his part to perform; in other
words, he may abandon it, and recover as damages
the profits which he would have received through
full performance. Such an abandonment is not technically a rescission of the contract, but is merely an
acceptance of the situation which the wrong-doing
of the other party has brought about. Generally
speaking, it is true that when a contract is not performed the party who is guilty of the first breach
is the one upon whom rests all the liability for the
nonperformance. A party who engages to do work
has a right to proceed free from any let or hindrance
of the other party, and if such other party interferes,
hinders, and prevents the doing of the work to such
an extent as to render its performance difficult and
largely diminish the profits, the first may treat the
contract as broken, and is not bound to proceed
under the added burdens and increased expense. It
may stop and sue for the damages which it has sustained by reason of the non-performance which the
other has caused."
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The same proposition is stated in 17 C. J. S. at pages
979-980, as follows :
"In some cases a breach of the contract of one
party may be of such character as to permit the
other party to abandon it and sue at once for entire
damages. Such an abandonment is to be distinguished from a technical rescission discussed in
paragraph 421, supra, in that the contract may still
be resorted to by the party for the purpose of fixing
the damages which he has sustained by reason of
the breach occasioning the abandonment of performance. Notice to the party in default of the intention
to claim damages is unnecessary."

It necessarily follows that since the defendant was
legally justified in stopping operations on October 5, it
did not breach the contract and plaintiffs can recover nothing, on account of defendant's failure to break the required
additional rock. We quote from Restatement of the Law of
Contracts under Sec. 312, as follows:
"a. The expression 'breach of contract' is confined to wrongful conduct. The promisor does not
necessarily commit a breach of contract if he fails to
perform his promise. Thus, under the definition in
the Section, non-performance of a contract, if justified, is not a breach. Justification may be due to
the fact that the duty arising when the contract was
formed has been discharged, or if that is not the
case, to the fact that a duty of immediate performance has not arisen because some condition precedent has not occurred."
In William B. Hughes Produce Co. v. Pulley, 47 Utah
544, 155 Pac. 337, the plaintiff Hughes Co., contracted to
purchase 600 pounds of potatoe·s from defendant and agreed
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to furnish the sacks for sacking them. It was undisputed
that plaintiff failed to furnish the sacks and that defendant abandoned the contract by selling the potatoes to a
third person. The trial court entered judgment for plaintiff, apparently on the theory that failure to supply the
sacks for the potatoes was not a sufficiently substantial
breach to justify defendant's abandonment of the contract.
On appeal, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and
the action dismissed. Our Supreme Court said:
"Now, it seems to us that while the defendant
had obligated himself to deliver the potatoes as stipulated in the agreement, the plaintiff had bound
himself to furnish the necessary sacks in which the
potatoes were to be sacked before delivery. If it be
held that plaintiff was not required to furnish the
sacks, then something he agreed to do must be eliminated from the agreement. * * * It might be
that a certain stipulation by the party agreeing to
perform it offers no excuse for the other party to
refuse to comply with all of the terms of his agreement. Courts should, however, be very careful not
to excuse parties from their obligations by substituting their own judgment for that of the parties with
respect to what constitutes a material stipulation in
a contract. * * * This court is firmly committed to the doctrine that courts may 'enforce, but
not create, liabilities' * * * What right have
we to excuse the plaintiff from furnishing the sacks
while we enforce the obligation of the defendant to
deliver the potatoes. * * * Under the terms of
the contract, the defendant was * * * required
to sack the potatoes and to deliver them sacked
within 30 days from the making of the contract.
He, we think, was not required to comply with these
conditions unless he was furnished the sacks in
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which to place the potatoes. Had the plaintiff complied with the terms of his agreement in that regard,
no dilema nor controversy would perhaps have arisen. The plaintiff, and not the defendant, therefore,
is responsible for defendant's failure to deliver the
potatoes at the time and place specified in the agreement. That being so, we cannot see how the plaintiff can prevail in an action for a breach of a contract, for which breach he alone is responsible."
Other cases which support defendant's contention that
it did not breach the contract by stopping work before all
of the rock was broken, and that the plaintiffs cannot recover anything on account of defendant's failure to complete
the work are: Bennett v. Shaunghnessy, et al., 6 Utah 273,
22 Pac. 156; Pool v. Motter, 55 Utah 288, 185 Pac. 714;
Pack v. Wines, 44 Utah 427, 141 Pac. 105; Lawley v. Wade,
39 Utah 537, 118 Pac. 484; Orphere, etc. v. Clayton, 44
Utah 453, 140 Pac. 653; McConnell v. Corona etc., 149 Cal.
60, 85 Pac. 929; Boomer v. Muir, (Cal. App.), 24 P. 2d 570;
Bradley v. Nevada, etc., 42 Nev. 411, 178 Pac. 906; Davis
v. Brown etc., 21 S. D. 173, 110 N. W. 113.
The foregoing authority establishes not only that the
defendant was justified in terminating the subcontract because of the plaintiffs' breach of the covenant to furnish
defendant sufficient compressed air to operate its drills
efficiently, but also that the defendant is entitled to recover
under its counterclaim the damage sustained by it as a
result of such breach. We have already pointed out the
number of shifts which defendant was required to pay for
when its men were idle because there was no compressed
air to operate defendant's equipment. A total of 14 shifts
was lost while the coyote hole was being drilled. Following
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the breakdown of the compressor on September 21, one of
defendant's employees remained at the quarry throughout
a period of two weeks. Several employees were paid showup time during this two-week period. All of these employees except Lowery were paid at an hourly rate. The evidence
of the amount paid by defendant for time lost due to air
compressor failure is definite and certain. As we compute
it, defendant paid in excess of $475.00 for show-up time
and for lost time including time spent by defendant's employees in getting the compressor started.
In addition to the lost time paid for by defendant, its
equipment remained idle in the quarry for substantial
periods because there was no compressed air available to
operate it. We concede that the amount of defendant's
damage in this connection is not definitely established, but
it was more than nominal.
Finally, the compressor which was furnished to operate defendant's leyner and the small Leroi compressor
furnished to operate defendant's drills for secondary rock
breaking were in poor mechanical condition and did not
furnish sufficient compressed air to operate defendant's
equipment efficiently. The evidence of the amount of damage on account of the poor mechanical condition of the
compressors is uncertain, but there can be no doubt but
that it was substantial. Again, the uncertainty lies solely
in the amount of damage and not in the fact of damage.
The covenant of Sprague with respect to the removal
by him from the quarry of the rock broken by defendant
into contract size may be inartfully worded but it is not
difficult to determine its meaning. Paragraph 10 provides
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in the first sentence that defendant is to commence the
performance of the subcontract as fixed in the prime contract, and to complete the same in sufficient time to give
Sprague the necessary time to deliver and place the materials on the levee within the time limit of the prime contract.
Then follows the further provision "all secondary breaking
of rock shall coincide with hauling operations so as not to
cause delay." While this language may suggest the age-old
question, which comes first the chicken or the egg?, there
can be little doubt but that the operations of Sprague and
the operations of the defendant were to be as nearly concurrent as practicable. Sprague could not haul the rock
away until it had been broken into contract size. But neither
could the defendant break the rock into contract size unless
it was removed from the quarry almost as fast as it was
broken. This is so because of the limited size of the quarry
floor.
If there were any ambiguity with respect to when
Sprague was to remove the contract size rock from the
quarry, the law would imply a covenant on his part to move
the rock as fast as necessary to eliminate any obstruction
to or interference with defendant's operations.
The foregoing proposition is of universal application
and is thus announced by the Supreme Court of Washington in Haley v. Brady, 17 Wash. 2d 775, 137 P. 2d 505, 146
A. L. R. 859, as follows:
"The following quotation from the case of M. L.
Ryder Building Co. v. City of Albany, 187 App. Div.
868, 176 N. Y. S. 456, 457, 458, is applicable to the
instant case :
" 'In every express contract for the erection of
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tive work, there is an implied term that the owner,
or other person for whom the work is contracted to
be done, will not obstruct, hinder, or delay the contractor, but, on the contrary, will in all ways facilitate the performance of the work to be done by him.
This is the principle which underlies the cases of
flrfessenger v. City of Buffalo, 21 N. Y. 196; Mansfield v. New York Cent. [&H.] R. R. Co., 102 N.Y.
205, 6 N. E. 386; Mulholland v. Mayor, 113 N. Y.
631, 20 N. E. 856; Horgan v. Mayor, 160 N. Y. 516,
55 N. E. 204; Gearty v. Mayor, 171 N. Y. 61, 63
N. E. 804; Del Genovese v. Third Ave. R. Co., 13
App. Div. 412, 43 N. Y. S. 8.
" 'In the Mansfield case the court said that the
contract implied-"an understanding by all parties
that they were to be unrestricted in the employment
of means to perform it, and that nothing which it
was the duty of the owner to do to enable the contractor to perform, should be left undone."'"
That Sprague violated both his express and implied
covenant to remove the rock from the quarry as fast as it
was broken into contract size, so as not to obstruct or interfere with defendant's work is uncontradicted. Between the
3rd day of February when the large explosion occurred,
and about the 23rd of February the defendant broke into
contract size all of the rock in the quarry that was visible
or exposed. Not a single piece of this contract size rock
was removed from the quarry until May. A few tons were
moved on May 7 and a few more between the 15th and
17th of May. A large amount of the contract size rock remained in the quarry until August. There is no indefiniteness or uncertainty as to when the contract size rock was
removed from the quarry because a record in triplicate was
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made at the time each truck load was hauled away. That
the faliure to remove the rock totally prevented the defendant from proceeding to break additional rock is clearly
· established. In the latter part of April, Sprague notified
the defendant that he intended to remove the contract size
rock from the quarry. Immediately the defendant sent its
employee Lowery to the quarry with equipment to proceed
to break more rock. Sprague, however, failed to move any
of the rock and plaintiff's employee and its equipment remained idle in the quarry for a week. He was unable to
break any rock because Sprague did not move any.
The authorities cited above fully sustain the proposition that defendant was legally justified in ceasing operations in the quarry on May 1, because of the breach of the
contract by Sprague. They also demonstrate that defendant
is entitled to recover damages sustained by it. This damage
may not be great but it is substantial, and the trial court
erred in not allowing the defendant to recover.
POINT II
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT
BREAK THE ROCK INTO CONTRACT SIZE
IN A WORKMANLIKE MANNER.
The contract provides that defendant "shall proceed
with such work in a workmanlike manner and complete the
same without unreasonable delay." The court found that
"defendant did not break the rock to the. size required in
a workmanlike manner." While this is a pure conclusion
of law and leaves the judgment without any support so far
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:,I (To be inserted next preceding Point II, page 26}

Regardless of the correctness

or

the fore.

going conclusions, defendant is entitled to re-

cover upon its counterclaim the balance due and
owing to it on account of the rock broken into
contract size and on account of the 1,000 tons
of rock broken b7 defendant and sold by Sprague.

The trial court round that defendant broke
into contract size 9. 799 tons of rock (for convenienee 9,800 tons} {R. 27). Sprague admitted
that he sold to Doyle Methevs 1,000 tons of the
rock broken by defendant. The contract price or
the·broken rock was forty-eight eents per ton
3
. (Ex. A). The total of these items is ,5,184.00.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company paid
~~ defendant $4,392.00. Sprague paid nothing. The
~ balance du& defendant is $792.00.
~

t~:

Plaintiffs in thei~ complaint concede that
defend,:nt is entitled to be paid this balance.

They clafm that defendant was given credit for

We have already demonstrated that neither of
the plaintiffs had any valid claim against defendant. There was, therefore, nothing against
which plaintiffs could credit the balance due
the defendant. It remains owing to the defendant.
it.

At a later place in this brief, we will point
out that United States Fidelit,y & Guaranty Compan7
became primarily liable to the detendant for the
performance of Sprague's covenants in the subcontract.

~

I

We submit that the court erred in not awarding the detendant a judgment against plaintiffs
tor the balance admittedly due tor the rock broken
by it.
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as it awards plaintiff's "loading and hauling costs" we
will treat it as a finding of fact.
At the outset we emphasize that the plaintiffs did not
in either of the complaints filed by them make any suggestion of complaint with respect to the manner in which
defendant broke the rock. Neither did they assert that any
of the equipment used by the defendant was insufficient
or unsuitable for the work. There was no allegation that
the defendant's employees were unskilled or that they were
negligent in performing the work.
The rock to be broken was then in its native state in
the quarry, which was a narrow canyon with a wall of
solid lava rock. The parties contemplated that two breaking operations would be necessary to reduce the rock to
contract size, because the contract provides that all secondary breaking of rock shall coincide with hauling operations so as not to cause delay, and that if the breaking of
the rock into contract size resulted in the production of
rock of any size which is usable or salable, the same was to
be paid for by Sprague at the rate of forty-eight cents per
ton.
Defendant proceeded to break the rock by the use of
explosives. The primary breaking was done by drilling
powder holes into the quarry wall. The first hole was drilled
into the side of the wall a distance of seventy feet with two
wings each thirty feet long. At the end of each wing, a
pocket was created and the powder deposited in the pocket
(R. 288). Sprague·'s superintendent visited the quarry
while these powder holes were being drilled, as did also
some Government engineers in charge of the prime project
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(R. 113-114). No one offered any criticism of defendant's
work. The first blast broke several thousand tons of the
rock. This left only a comparatively small part of the total
to be broken. The primary breaking of this part was done
by drilling the powder holes on the top of the quarry wall
(R. 367-8). After defendant quit the quarry in October,
plaintiffs adopted the same method of doing the primary
breaking that had been employed by the defendant (R. 119).
The secondary breaking of the rock was done by drilling powder holes into the larger pieces and by plastering
the explosive to the side of the smaller pieces. Plaintiffs
also adopted this method of secondary breaking after defendant left the quarry in October (R. 115).
The provision of the contract requiring the defendant
to proceed with the work in a workmanlike manner and
complete the same without unreasonable delay adds nothing
to defendant's duties or obligations. If the contract were
silent on the subject, the law would imply a covenant on
the part of defendant to proceed in a workmanlike manner
and complete the work without unreasonable delay. See
Westbrook v. Watts, 268 S. W. 2d 694, (Tex. Civ. App.
1954).
When the defendant undertook to do the work in a
workmanlike manner, it undertook to do it as a reasonably
skillful person would. It did not undertake to employ the
highest skill known in the mining industry, nor would it
discharge its duty by employing the least skill known to that
industry. A workmanlike manner of breaking rock is the
method that would be employed by a reasonably skillful
miner. See Holland v. Rhoades, 56 Ore. 206, 106 Pac. 779;
Westbrook v. Watts, supra; Economy, etc. v. Raymond, etc.,
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111 F. 2d 875, (C. C. A. 7th) ; Cameron v. Sisson, 24 Ariz.
226, 246 P. 2d 189.
It seems to us that the obvious method of breaking a

mountain of solid lava rock into sizes of 50 to 350 pounds
is by the use of explosives. No witness in this case suggested any other method, and the plaintiffs themselves
adopted it after the defendant quit because of lack of compressed air.
There is no evidence that the holes made in the mountain to receive the explosives were unsuitable for that purpose or were improperly located. Making the powder holes
on the top of the wall may not have been as efficient as
putting them in the side, but at that time most of the rock
had been broken by the initial explosion, and the condition
of the quarry had been radically changed. In any event,
plaintiffs themselves used this method of primary breaking
when they took over the operation after October 5.
No complaint is made that the equipment employed
by defendant to break the rock was either unsuitable or
inefficient. The operators of the equipment were experienced and competent workmen. The explosives were used
with skill. One explosion broke several thousand tons of
the rock.
We submit that the finding under consideration is
without support either in the pleadings or the evidence and
cannot form the basis of any judgment against the defendant.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
PROVE THAT THE COST TO PLAINTIFF OF
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PRODUCING THE ADDITIONAL ROCK EXCEEDED WHAT HE AGREED TO PAY DEFENDANT.
Assuming, contrary to the undisputed facts, that defendant was not justified in failing to produce the full
amount of contract size rock required, there is no factual
basis for awarding plaintiffs any damages on account of
such failure.
The trial court found that the defendant broke into
contract size 9,799 tons of rock, and that the amount required under the contract of January 25, was 15,400 tons.
For present purposes we accept these findings. In this
connection, however, we point out that Sprague admits that
he sold 1,000 tons of rock that had been broken by defendant (R. 251). This sale was made without the knowledge
or consent of the defendant (R. 251), and since the rock
was not used upon the levee, defendant must under any
circumstances have this amount of rock deducted from
the amount which it was required under the contract to
break.
This 4,600 tons of rock was broken by Sprague, that is
he hired the necessary employees and equipment to do the
work. He did not purchase the additional rock and did not
subcontract the breaking, or call for bids. In this circumstance and upon the assumption above stated, the measure
of Sprague's damage for the failure of the defendant to
break into contract size the additional 4,600 tons of rock
would be the difference between what Sprague agreed to
pay the defendant and the reasonable cost to him of breaking the rock. In determining this difference, Sprague is
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not entitled to any costs of the compressed air used to break
the rock, because under the contract he agreed to furnish
the compressed air.
This rule of damages is elementary. See Dover Lumber
Company v. Case, 31 Idaho 296, 170 Pac. 108; Northern
Construction Company v. Johnson, 132 Ark. 528, 201 S. W.
510; Richmond, etc. v. Black, 39 Cal. App. 1, 177 Pac. 508;
Trinity, etc. v. Mills, 293 Ky. 463, 169 S. W. 2d 311; Schaffner v. President, etc., 94 Ind. App. 554, 154 N. E. 780.
There is no finding of fact by which it is determined
what this difference amounts to. The finding "that by
reason of said breaches of said contract on the part of defendant, the plaintiff Sprague suffered damages in the
sum of $6,368.85, which sum was necessarily expended by
plaintiff Sprague in performing those things required by
the contract between plaintiff and defendant to be performed by defendant over and above all credits given by
plaintiff to defendant" falls short of such a determination.
It is a pure conclusion of law. It is similar to the finding made in Duggins v. Colby, 45 Utah 335, 145 Pac.
1042. In that case defendant sold to the plaintiff some
sheep in exchange for a tract of land, and agreed to have
the sheep registered before a certain date. Before that date,
plaintiff sold the sheep to third parties with an agreement
to have them registered. Some of the sheep were not registered by defendant, and plaintiff compromised the claims
of the parties to whom he. sold the sheep. The court found
only that registering sheep adds to their market value and
that by the failure of defendant to have the sheep registered,
plaintiff's damage was a sum equal to the amount for which
he compromised with his buyers. There was no finding as
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to the number of sheep not registered or of the market value
of unregistered sheep of the kind sold. This court held that
the finding made was a mere conclusion and since the true
measure of plaintiff's damage was the difference between
the agreed value of the land given in exchange for the sheep
and the reasonable market value of the sheep unregistered,
there was no determination of this issue and nothing to
support a judgment for plaintiff.
Not only is there not a finding that it cost Sprague
more to break the additional rock than he agreed to pay defendant, but the memorandum opinion of the court declares
that such cost was less than what he agreed to pay the defendant. We quote from the memorandum opinion the following:
"The evidence reveals the breaking of rock by
Sprague after Boyles quit cost 45.5 cents per ton
for the 5,485 tons broken by him, or $4,495.55, which
shows a cost incurred by Sprague which had it been
done under the contract with Boyles would be
$4,632.80, a saving to Sprague of $137.00."
While the court was in error in stating that the contract
required defendant to break 5,485 tons in addition to that
broken by it, there is, nevertheless, a clear-cut decision that
the cost to Sprague of breaking the additional rock was
45.5 cents per ton, which is 2.50 cents less than Sprague
agreed to pay. In this state of the record the award made
against the defendant for the sum of $6,668.85 is not only
unsupported by any finding of fact, but is contrary to the
decision made by the trial court.
Quite apart from the foregoing considerations, the evidence in the record is insufficient to prove that the cost to
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Sprague of breaking the additional rock was more than he
agreed to pay the defendant. The evidence produced by
the plaintiff with respect to the cost of breaking the additional rock consists of several packages or bundles of miscellaneous invoices, bills and statements purporting to have
been made by various parties covering material of various
kinds, rental of equipment and machinery, claims for work
and labor and for transportation, taxes and other charges.
Mrs. Sprague described the contents of these various packages and bundles as bills rendered "for the production of
rock" (R. 136-157). The defendant objected to the introduction in evidence of these packages and bundles (R. 141-148).
In addition to these packages and bundles of miscellaneous documents, plaintiff introduced in evidence a number of checks issued to various parties and purporting to
bear the endorsement of the payees. No proof of such
endorsements was offered. The checks were identified
simply as having been issued to pay bills for labor and
material used "in the production of rock."
The objection of the defendant to the packages and to
the checks was clearly well taken. See Zemp etc. v. Harmon
etc., (S. C. 1954), 82 S. E. 2d 531.
Even if they were admissible in evidence it is impossible to find in this heterogenous mass of documents any
segregation of the items relating to the cost of breaking the
rock. Assuming that the documents in the packages are
invoices for labor and material furnished to Sprague, that
the invoices were paid, and that the labor and material
went into the project, there is still no way of determining
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what items are to be allocated to the work which defendant
agreed to do. There is no segregation of the cost of the
compressed air required to break the additional rock, or of
the cost of the drills required in breaking the rock, or of
the cost of the labor required to operate the drills, or of
the cost of hauling the rock from the quarry to the levee.
There is no breakdown whatever that would enable the
court to say that it cost Sprague anything more to perform
the labor which defendant undertook to perform than he
agreed to pay defendant.
This is not a case in which damages could be presumed
to arise out of the failure of defendant to produce the
specified quantity of rock. The burden rested upon the
plaintiffs to prove that it cost them more to break the additional rock than Sprague was required to pay under his
contract with defendant. They did not meet that burden.
See Stevens v. Mitchell, 51 N. M. 411, 186 P. 2d 386.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE
PLAINTIFFS ANY AMOUNT ON ACCOUNT
OF LOADING OR HAULING COSTS.
The court in its Finding of Fact No. 5 concluded "that
by reason of said breach of said contract on the part of the
defendant, the plaintiff Sprague also suffered damages in
the sum of $823.15 for increased costs of loading and hauling rock." There are no facts found which afford any basis
for this conclusion. Neither is there any evidence in the
record to support it.
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All defendant agreed to do was to break a specified
:. amount of rock into certain .sizes within a limited time, and
in a workmanlike manner. We have demonstrated that de·fendant . was excused from breaking the full amount of
rock because of the failure of plaintiffs to furnish compressed air, and that Sprague's failure to complete his
prime contract in time was due to a combination of circumstances for which the defendant was not responsible. We
have also shown that the work done by the defendant in
breaking more than 9,000 tons of rock was done in a workmanlike manner.
Even if it be assumed that the foregoing conclusions
are incorrect, there is no basis for awarding the plaintiffs
anything for so-called increased costs of loading and hauling rock. All that appears in the record as to the matter of
loading and hauling costs is that to begin with Sprague
paid his truckers 70 cents per ton for hauling the rock, and
later increased the rate to 80 cents (R. 267). This appears
to have been solely a matter of agreement between the
parties, and nothing that the defendant did or failed to do
had any connection with the increase of the hauling rates.
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision said that
the increased hauling charges were the result of a "strike"
on the part of the truckers because the rock was not produced as fast as they could haul it. This assertion in the
Memorandum Decision is unfounded. There is not a word
of evidence of any "strike" or protest of any kind on
the part of any of the truckers who hauled the rock from
the quarry. All that appears in the record is some hearsay
testimony objected to by the defendant and erroneously
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received by the trial court to the effect that some truckers
wanted more money for hauling rock and complained that
they couldn't get loaded fast enough and couldn't make any
money (R. 267). There is likewise not any evidence· that
the methods of operations of the defendant in the quarry
varied in the slightest degree at anytime. The rock· was
produced in exactly the same manner both before and··after
the increase in the hauling rates.
We respectfully submit that the award to the plaintiffs for increased costs of loading and hauling r6ck is
wholly unwarranted by either the pleadings or the evidence.

POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFFS $850.00 ON ACCOUNT OF·SPRAGUE'S"
FAILURE TO COMPLETE HIS PRIME CONTRACT.
It is conceded that Sprague did not complete his prime
contract within the time therein provided and was penal::·
ized for his delay. The defendant is in no manner responsi. I
ble for any delay on the part of Sprague in the performance:
of the prime contract. The delay was due to his own fai~- '
ure to furnish the defendant with compressed air and -tor
remove the contract-size rock from the quarry within a
reasonable time after it was broken. His financial collapse,
weather conditions, restrictions upon the use of highways
for hauling rock, modification of the prime contract and
changes in the plans of the levee undoubtedly caused considerable delay for which defendant is in no manner responsible.
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Sprague's defaults have been dealt with above and will
not be reiterated, other than to emphasize that the coyote
holes would have been completed in a fraction of the time
actually employed if the defendant had been supplied with
compressed air sufficient to operate its drills efficiently,
and that several thousand tons of rock broken into contract
size remained in the quarry from the latter part of Febru..
ary until after the middle of May and a lesser amount until
August, where it completely prevented the defendant from
proceeding to break the additional rock required to fulfill
its contract.
In addition, Sprague's failure to make the payment
due in April justified defendant in abandoning the contract
on May 1. The payment was due April 20, and it amounted
to $4,392.00.
This court has held in line with authorities elsewhere
that failure to pay for labor and material at the time agreed
upon relieves the contractor of his obligation to proceed
with the work.
In Bennett v. Shaughnessy, et al., 6 Utah 273, 22 Pac.
156, plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract whereby
the plaintiff undertook to drive a tunnel along a vein of ore
in the defendant's mine for a distance of 1,200 feet, and to
complete the work on a specified date. The defendant agreed
to pay for the work as it progressed to each 100 feet.
Plaintiff constructed the tunnel a distance of 100 feet, and
was paid according to the contract. He continued the work
until the tunnel had been completed to a length of more
than 200 feet. Defendant failed to pay for the second 100
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feet when it became due, and the plaintiff abandoned the
work. He brought suit to recover for the work done and to
have the judgment made a lien upon the property. The
Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah held that plaintiff
was justified in abandoning the tunnel work and was entitled to recover for the full footage performed also a lien
upon the defendant's property. The court said:

"* * * The character of the work to be
performed under the contract in this case, the
length of time given, and the amount of money required for its completion, as well as the language
of the contract itself, show that the object of the
provision for payments at stated periods during the
prosecution of the work was to enable plaintiff with
the money thus obtained to continue the work until
completed. The payment of the $1,000.00 upon the
completion and acceptance of each 100 feet was a
condition precedent to ·the further prosecution of
the work by the plaintiff, and the failure ·of the
defendants to pay the $1,000.00 due on the completion of the second 100 feet justified plaintiff in
abandoning the contract, and, the defendants being
in fault, the plaintiff was entitled to recover for the
work done. The judgment of the district court is
affirmed."
Another reason why Sprague cannot recover any damage for the alleged delay of the defendant is that the contract sued upon authorized Sprague to "put on such additional force and outfit as may be required" if the defendant
should be unable to furnish adequate labor, equipment or
material to complete the contract within the time specified.
The parties to a contract are, of course, at liberty to provide for an exclusive remedy for delay in performance of
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the work agreed upon. We submit that the parties to the
contract under consideration did just that.
In Russell v. Bothwell, et al., 57 Utah 362, 194 Pac.
1109, the contract covering the construction of a dwelling
provided that if the contractor should be delayed in the
completion or prosecution of the work by the negligence or
default of the owner, then the time for completion of the
work might be extended for a period equivalent to the time
lost by reason of such negligence or default. The contractor
was delayed by the failure of the owner to furnish material
promptly, and this court held that no damages could be
recovered.

POINT VI
UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY COMPANY IS LIABLE TO DEFENDANT
FOR FAILURE TO FURNISH COMPRESSED
AIR BECAUSE IT ASSUMED THE OBLIGATIONS OF SPRAGUE UNDER THE SUBCONTRACT.
Defendant does not assert any claim against the United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Company for failure of Sprague
to furnish compressed air prior to the time it induced the
defendant to resume operations in the quarry. Defendant
does, however, maintain United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company is liable for failure to furnish compressed air
after September 21. This liability is founded upon its
agreement to do so in consideration of the defendant resuming performance of the subcontract.
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As already stated, the defendant was prevented from
performing its undertaking to break the specified amount
of rock by the failure of Sprague to remove the contract
size rock from the quarry. Defendant was unable to do
anything in the quarry from the latter part of February
until early in August, because the contract-size rock re-mained in the quarry during that period. It is true that
defendant sent its employee back to the quarry the latter
part of April when Sprague informed it that he intended
to move the rock to the levee, and that this employee drilled
a few holes into some oversize rock preparatory to blasting.
However, Sprague did not move any rock, and defendant's
employee was withdrawn from the quarry on May 1. Even
if defendant had not been prevented from performing its
obligation by the failure of Sprague to move the rock, it
was fully justified in terminating the subcontract on May
1, by his failure to make the progress payment which was
due on April 20.
In this status of the subcontract, the United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Company appears on the scene.
Sprague was financially unable to pay the progress payment
or the bills he had incurred for labor and materials furnished to him and used in the performance of his prime
contract. The Guaranty Company was his surety not only
on his performance bond but also on his payment bond.
The progress payment plus the bills owing by Sprague
exceeded $30,000.00. These bills and the progress payment
were paid by the surety.
In the latter part of July, it sent its representative Mr.
Douglas to the project with instructions to do everything
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possible to assist Sprague in the performance of his obligations. Mr. Douglas testified:
"Q. Did you make any arrangements with Mr.
Sprague or anyone connected with Boyles Bros. with
respect to this work?
"A. Yes.

"Q. This quarry work?
"A. I talked to Mr. Stevens relative to his
contract with Sprague and he outlined to me what
his responsibilities were and what he intended to do,
and I as representative of United States Fidelity
and Guaranty Company come down to assist Sprague
in connection conjunction with working with him
to try and do that.
"Q. Didn't you tell or assure Mr. Stevens that
Boyles Bros. Drilling Company would be paid for
work?
"A. Well, as a surety to the contractor I did
assure him but it wouldn't be necessary by the fact
we were bonding the contract, and assured him he
Would be paid for work he did."

On August 11, Mr. Douglas on behalf of United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Company wrote defendant among other
things "we stand ready to fulfill our part in this matter
and we must insist and we feel our demand is only reasonable that you fulfill your part of the agreement" (Ex. 27-P).
A short time later Mr. Douglas again writes to the
defendant to express "our appreciation of the manner in
which you have tackled the quarry job and the results that
are being obtained" (Ex. 28-D). Shortly thereafter, a 315
compressor was sent to the quarry and within a few weeks
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several thousand tons of rock were broken into contract
size by defendant.
We think there is. implicit in this evidence on agreementon the part of United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company to perform all of the obligations of Sprague under the
subcontract in consideration of the defendant resuming operations thereunder, and that this agreement made the
surety company primarily liable to furnish the defendant
sufficient compressed air to operate its drills. In support
of this point see Everts v. Matteson, 21 Cal. 2d 437, 132 P.
2d 476; 4 Williston on Contracts, (Rev. Ed. 1936), Sec.
1211.
If there were any doubt about the primary liability of
the Guaranty Company, it is dispelled by the positive allegation in the original complaint to the effect that it became
obligated to perform the contract and did perform it (R.
43-4).
POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFFS $292.80 FOR ROCK PURCHASED.
The court concluded in its findings of fact "that by
reason of the breach of contract on the part of defendant
the plaintiff suffered damages in the sum of $292.80 for
rock he purchased to complete his contract with the United
States."
There are several reasons why this award is erroneous,
even if it be~ that defendant is not excused from its
failure to produce the full amount of rock provided for in
the contract.
In the first place, the so-called finding is a conclusion
of law, and was without any basis in fact. Secondly, there
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is no evidence that Sprague purchased any rock to take the
place of rock which defendant did not produce. When
plaintiff offered eyidence of the purchase of rock, the court
sustained the defendant's objection to the offer (R. 81).
Finally, it is undenied that Sprague, pursuant to the
provisions of the contract, proceeded to break the additional
rock after defendant left the quarry on October 5. The full
measure of plaintiff's damage for defendant's failure to
produce all rock required by the contract, assuming the
failure is not excused by the plaintiff's breach of the contract, is the cost of breaking the rock exclusive of the cost
of compressed air. If Sprague purchased additional rock
and if that rock was of the kind which defendant was required to produce, he made that purchase on his own account and upon no assumption is defendant liable therefor.
In this connection it should be pointed out that
Sprague's prime contract was modified, subsequent to making the subcontract with defendant, and that it required
1100 tons of rock to meet the requirements of the modification (R. 79). If Sprague did purchase rock (and there
is no evidence that he did), he undoubtedly used it to meet
the modification of the prime contract.
POINT VIII
THE JUDGMENT IS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE
IT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS
OF FACT.
The complaint alleges that the defendant only partially
performed its agreement to break the specified amount of
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rock and that as a result of such failure Sprague paid certain sums for labor and material required to break the additional rock. The defendant in its answer and counterclaim admitted that it produced only part of the rock required by the contract, but was prevented from fully performing its obligation by the failure of Sprague to furnish
sufficient compressed air to operate its drills efficiently,
and to remove the rock from the quarry as it was broken
in contract size.
The controlling issue so far as the plaintiff's case is
concerned is: Did Sprague supply the defendant with sufficient compressed air to operate its drills efficiently?
The findings of fact made by the trial court are completely silent upon this issue. Not a word is said anywhere
upon the subject of compressed air. The trial court adopted
the findings proposed by the plaintiff who studiously
avoided entirely the matter of compressed air.
The so-called finding that Sprague performed his part
of the subcontract is a pure conclusion of law. Whether he
did perform his contract was the turning point of the
lawsuit. Without an affirmative finding that Sprague
furnished the defendant throughout its operations in the
quarry sufficient compressed air to operate efficiently the
drills required to break the rock, there is no foundation
whatever for any judgment· in plaintiff's favor. With respect to Sprague's surety, its right to recover could rise
no higher than those of its insured. That the judgment is
not supported by findings of fact and must be vacated is
not a debatable proposition. The only question is whether
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this court should direct the trial court to dismiss the complaint or to grant a new trial. Inasmuch as there is no
conflict in the evidence with respect to Sprague's failure to
furnish compressed air as he agreed to do, there is no
alternative open to this court except to direct that the
complaint be dismissed.
POINT IX
THE JUDGMENT MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF THE COURT
TO FIND ON THE MATERIAL ISSUES
RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS.
If we indulge the violent assumption that there was

some conflict in the evidence with respect to the nonperformance by the parties of their respective covenants in
the contract, the judgment would have to be vacated, because of the failure of the trial court to make findings
upon any of such issues. The first count in the complaint
alleged in substance that the defendant only partially performed its duties under the contract, that Sprague paid
out certain sums for labor and material to complete the
duties of defendant, and that Sprague "suffered damages by
reason of defendant's failure to fully perform" the contract
a certain sum "for additional loading and hauling costs."
It was further alleged that by reason of defendant's failure
to perform, Sprague was unable to perform his prime contract, and suffered liquidated damages in a certain amount.
The second count is practically identical to the first
count, except that United States Fidelity & Guaranty Com-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

46

pany is alleged to have paid out the sums and suffered the
damages that Sprague claims in the first count to have paid
out and suffered.
The defendant in its answer and counterclaim admits
that it did not produce the full amount of rock specified in
the contract, and alleges as legal justification for such failure the breach by Sprague of his covenant to furnish compressed air, his failure to remove the rock from the quarry
as it was broken by defendant, and his failure to pay the
seventy-five percent of the contract price on April 20. Defendant also asserted that Sprague sold a large amount of
the rock broken by defendant, for which he did not account
to the defendant.
The counterclaim also alleged that because of the
breaches of the subcontract by Sprague, defendant after
producing a large quantity of rock to the contract size,
ceased work and removed its men and equipment from the
quarry, that about that time the United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Company informed the defendant that Sprague
was insolvent and financially unable to proceed with his
contract, that if defendant would resume breaking rock
it would furnish the necessary compressed air, and would
pay for all of the rock; that in reliance upon these promises, defendant resumed the work of producing the rock as
required by the subcontract with Sprague, that United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Company failed to perform its
promises except to make the progress payment, and as a
result of such failure, defendant again ceased work and
removed its men and equipment from the quarry before
the contract amount of rock was produced.
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The reply put in issue the affirmative allegations of
defendant's counterclaim, except plaintiffs admitted that
they sold some rock that was broken by the defendant. They
asserted "that defendant was given credit for the amount
of said rock."
An examination of the findings made and entered by
the trial court reveals no determination whatever of any
of the issues raised by the above mentioned pleadings of
the parties, nor was there a finding of fact which necessarily or even by implication resolves any such issue.
Upon the assumption above made, the judgment must
be vacated for it is settled by a long line of decisions of
this court that it is reversible error for the trial court to
fail to find upon any material issue. See Gaddis Investment Company v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278 P. 2d 284,
and cases there cited.
POINT X
THE PRESENT ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ABATED BECAUSE OF THE PENDENCY OF
ANOTHER SUIT.
The record disclosed that on September 22, 1952, the
plaintiffs commenced an action in the District Court of Salt
Lake County to recover damages from the defendant on
account of an alleged breach of the contract now under
consideration (R. 43-4). The complaint is in substance the
same as the complaint in Case No. 99370, the only difference
being that it was alleged that the plaintiff, United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Company, issued its bond for the per-
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formance of the contract of defendant with plaintiff, W. W.
Sprague, and that by reason of the alleged breach of contract on the part of defendant, United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Company became obligated to perform said contract, and did perform said contract to its damage in the
sum of $5,585.22.
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff asked leave to file an
amended complaint (R. 49). The proposed amended complaint begins with the recitation that no attempt is made
to plead a cause of action on behalf of United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company. It omits the allegations with
respect to the guaranty of the contract between Sprague
and defendant. Otherwise, the cause of action in the proposed amended complaint is the same as the original complaint. The trial court refused to permit the filing of the
amended complaint (R. 57).
In its answer and counterclaim the defendant set up
pendency of this prior action.
We submit that the present action should have been
dismissed because the order ref~ng to allow the plaintiff
to file an amended complaint isJt>ar to the maintenance of
the present action. To this effect are: State v. California
Packing, etc., 105 Utah 191, 145 P. 2d 784.
SUMMARY
The uncontradicted evidence in this case discloses that
Sprague breached his contract in three distinct particulars.
One, he failed to furnish the defendant with sufficient compressed air to efficiently operate its drills required to break
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the rock into contract size. Two, he failed and neglected to
remove from the quarry the rock broken into contract size,
thereby preventing the defendant from performing its
undertaking to break a specified amount of rock. Three,
he failed to pay the defendant seventy-five percent of the
contract price on April 20, or at all.
The foregoing breaches of the contract by Sprague
justified the defendant in abandoning the contract on May
1, and again on October 5. Sprague having breached his
contract cannot recover any damages from the defendant,
but on the contrary is liable to the defendant for the damage sustained by it as a result of those breaches. Sprague's
surety has no greater rights under the contract sued upon
than Sprague has, and it became primarily liable to the
defendant for the damage sustained by it as the result of
its failure to furnish defendant with sufficient compressed
air to operate its drills following the breakdown of the 315
compressor on September 21.
Even if it be assumed that the defendant was not legally warranted in terminating the contract on October 5,
the plaintiffs can recover nothing because they undertook
to produce the additional rock as they had the right to do
under the subcontract, and there is no evidence in the record
which proves or tends to prove that it cost them more to
break the rock than Sprague agreed to pay the defendant.
There is no claim made in the pleadings and there is
no evidence that the rock broken by defendant under the
contract was broken in an unworkmanlike manner. There
is no evidence that anything done by the defendant or
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omitted by it caused the increased "loading and hauling
costs" incurred by Sprague.
There is no evidence that Sprague's default under his
prime contract was due to anything other than his own
failure to perform his subcontract with defendant and his
own modification of the prime contract and his own financial failure and weather conditions.
The findings of fact made by the trial court are insufficient to support the judgment appealed from, and the
material issues raised by the pleadings were not determined.
Finally, the action should have been abated because
another action between the same parties involving precisely
the same issues was pending and undetermined in the same
court.
Respectfully submitted,
GRANT H. BAGLEY,
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR.,
for VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
Attorneys for Appellant.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

